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 Steven S. Bocchino appeals the final decision of the 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
affirming the Bankruptcy Court’s order of 
nondischargeability of civil judgment debts pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). Bocchino v. SEC, No. 3-14-cv-00662, 
2014 WL 4796425 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2014). For the reasons 
that follow, we will affirm the decision of the District Court. 
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL 
HISTORY 
 
 Bocchino limits his appeal to two discrete legal rulings 
and does not challenge the Bankruptcy Court’s or the District 
Court’s factfinding.1 Therefore, the following facts are 
undisputed. 
 
 Bocchino worked as a stockbroker. The 
nondischargeability order at issue relates to civil judgments 
against Bocchino for two private placement investments he 
solicited in 1996 while affiliated with a brokerage firm.2 The 
first investment involved an entity known as Traderz 
Associates Holding, Inc. (“Traderz”). Bocchino learned from 
a superior that Traderz “might go public” and that the 
endeavor was supported by “some commitment” from a 
                                              
1 (See Appellant’s Br. at 4 (“[T]here were no disputes 
of facts before the Bankruptcy Court or the District Court, 
and all issues were decided as a matter of law.”)). 
2  A “private placement” is a sale of securities to a 
relatively small number of select investors as a way of raising 
capital, as opposed to a “public issue,” whereby securities are 
made available for sale on the open market. 
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popular fashion model. In re Bocchino, 504 B.R. 403, 407 
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 2013). Based solely on these facts, 
and without any other independent investigation into the 
quality of the entity, Bocchino immediately sought 
investment from clients. Bocchino received over $40,000 in 
commissions from Traderz sales. The second private 
placement involved Fargo Holdings, Inc. (“Fargo”). The 
exact source of Bocchino’s information regarding Fargo is 
unclear. Bocchino claimed that he knew about Fargo from an 
associate at the brokerage firm. Bocchino also claimed that he 
initially learned of Fargo by meeting a day trader affiliated 
with the entity. Nevertheless, Bocchino only obtained cursory 
documentation about the entity before soliciting sales. He did 
not conduct any independent investigation into the quality of 
the investment. This lack of investigation occurred despite 
Bocchino’s awareness that Fargo’s principal’s “full-time ‘job’ 
was law student.” In re Bocchino, 504 B.R. at 408. Bocchino 
received $14,000 in commissions for his clients’ stock 
purchases in Fargo.3  
 
 Both Traderz and Fargo turned out to be fraudulent 
ventures. The principals of each entity were criminally 
convicted, and the anticipated value of the investments 
vanished. In the early 2000s, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) brought two civil law enforcement 
actions in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
New York against those who sold investments in the entities. 
SEC v. Goldman Lender & Co. Holdings et al., 98-CV-7525 
                                              
3 Bocchino emphasizes that he independently inquired 
into Fargo’s financial health. We find this fact 
inconsequential, as he did not conduct this investigation until 
after he received payments from clients.  
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(JGK) (“Goldman Action”) and SEC v. Nnebe et al., 01-CV-
5247 (KMW) (“Nnebe Action”). The Goldman Action alleged 
that Bocchino had violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Act 
and Sections 10(b) and 15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act 
for inducing investors via high pressure sales tactics and 
material misrepresentations. The court entered a default 
judgment ordering Bocchino to pay $35,090.00 in 
disgorgement, $14,779.70 in prejudgment interest, and 
$35,090.00 in civil penalties. Similarly, the Nnebe Action 
alleged Bocchino violated Sections 5(a), 5(c), and 17(a) of the 
Securities Act and Sections 10(b), 15(a), and Rule 10b-5 of 
the Securities Exchange Act. The court entered a default 
judgment consisting of $14,800.00 in disgorgement, 
$4,207.85 in prejudgment interest, and $75,000.00 in civil 
penalties. In total, Bocchino was liable for $178,967.55. 
  
 After Bocchino filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
protection in 2009, the SEC petitioned the Bankruptcy Court 
for a judgment that the Goldman Action and Nnebe Action 
judgments were nondischargeable. The SEC argued that the 
funds were “obtained by . . . false pretenses, a false 
representation, or actual fraud” under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(2)(A). After post-trial briefing, the Bankruptcy 
Court ordered the civil penalties discharged under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1328(a)(2), but retained the remaining $68,877.55 as 
nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).  
 
 The Bankruptcy Court recognized that Bocchino 
believed that his statements to prospective investors were 
true. Accordingly, it found that “Bocchino did not knowingly 
make any false statements.” In re Bocchino, 504 B.R. at 405. 
However, the Bankruptcy Court continued its inquiry into the 
application of § 523(a)(2)(A). The Bankruptcy Court relied 
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upon In re White, 128 F. App’x 994, 998–99 (4th Cir. 2005) 
(per curiam) (unpublished), for the proposition that the 
scienter requirement of § 523(a)(2)(A) may be satisfied by 
grossly reckless behavior. The Bankruptcy Court also 
reasoned that stockbrokers are akin to fiduciaries and the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts generally supports a finding of 
fraudulent misrepresentation for a reckless disregard for the 
truth. The Bankruptcy Court further noted that the Supreme 
Court found that grossly reckless conduct satisfied the 
scienter requirement for defalcation under § 523(a)(4) of the 
Bankruptcy Act. Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S.Ct. 
1754, 1757 (2013). The Bankruptcy Court described 
Bocchino’s actions as “egregious” and “grossly reckless” in 
pursuit of his “own greedy purpose, i.e., commissions.” In re 
Bocchino, 504 B.R. at 408. “Not only was [Bocchino] 
negligent, but extremely reckless. As an experienced 
stockbroker, he knew, or should have known, that an 
independent investigation into the quality of the product he 
was selling was imperative.” Id. Bocchino appealed. He 
challenged (1) the Court’s application of the grossly reckless 
standard to satisfy the scienter requirement of § 523(a)(2)(A), 
and (2) the Court’s finding that his actions were the 
proximate cause of his clients’ losses.  
 
 On appeal, the District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy 
Court in its entirety. First, the District Court found that 
holding grossly reckless behavior nondischargeable under 
§ 523(a)(2)(A) accords with the overall policy goal of the 
Bankruptcy Act—to limit the opportunity of a fresh start to 
the “honest but unfortunate debtor.” Bocchino, 2014 WL 
4796425, at *2 (quoting Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 
286–87 (1991)). The District Court also found Bullock, 
related Third Circuit cases, and In re White persuasive. In 
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consideration of Bocchino’s proximate cause claim, the Court 
applied general tort law principles to conclude that 
Bocchino’s clients had reasonably relied on his statements as 
their fiduciary, the investments failed, and the clients suffered 
losses. The Court reasoned that both the reckless and criminal 
activities of the principals were substantial factors in the 
clients’ losses, but because the failure of the entities was 
reasonably foreseeable upon the exercise of due diligence, the 
crimes were not superseding causes of the losses.  
 
II.  DISCUSSION4 
 1.  Standard of Review  
 
 “Because the District Court sat as an appellate court, 
reviewing an order of the Bankruptcy Court, our review of the 
District Court’s determinations is plenary.” In re Heritage 
Highgate, Inc., 679 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting In 
re Rashid, 210 F.3d 201, 205 (3d Cir. 2000)). Therefore, we 
review the Bankruptcy Court’s legal determinations de novo 
and review its factual determinations for clear error. Id. 
  
2.  Scienter 
                                              
4 The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1334. The District Court had jurisdiction to review 
the final order of the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 158(a). We have jurisdiction to review the final order of the 
District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  
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 The Bankruptcy Act provides a means for the 
insolvent to start anew. Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286. The Act 
limits this opportunity to those debtors who are “honest but 
unfortunate.” Id. at 286–87. The Act accomplishes this goal 
by requiring a creditor seeking to prevent a discharge to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that its claim meets one 
of the statutory exceptions to discharge. Id. at 287. The 
exceptions are strictly construed. Id. at 286. Section 
523(a)(2)(A) of the Act states: 
 
A discharge under section 727, 1141, 
1228(a), 1228(b) or 1328(b) of this title does 
not discharge an individual debtor from any 
debt . . . (2) for money, property, services, or 
an extension, renewal, or refinancing of 
credit, to the extent obtained by—(A) false 
pretenses, a false representation, or actual 
fraud, other than a statement respecting the 
debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition . 
. . . 
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). The SEC argues that Bocchino’s 
gross recklessness satisfies the statute’s requisite knowledge 
and intent to deceive. Bocchino responds that the statute 
requires proof of actual intent to defraud. 5  Though we 
                                              
5  Interestingly, Bocchino concedes that recklessness 
may establish the requisite scienter for § 523(a)(2)(A). (See 
Appellant’s Br. at 7). Bocchino also admits that his conduct 
was reckless. (Id.). Nevertheless, Bocchino concludes that the 
Bankruptcy Court did not find the requisite scienter because it 
concluded that Bocchino did not knowingly make any false 
statements. (Id.). This argument does not comport with the 
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implicitly approved of the SEC’s position in our 
consideration of In re Cohen, 185 B.R. 171 (Bankr. D.N.J. 
1994) (“Cohen I”), aff’d, 191 B.R. 599, 604 (D.N.J. 1996) 
(“Cohen II”), aff’d, In re Cohen, 106 F.3d 52 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(“Cohen III”), aff’d, 523 U.S. 213 (1998), we did not dedicate 
any substantial treatment to the issue. Therefore, the scienter 
requirement of § 523(a)(2)(A) remains, largely, an issue of 
first impression. We conclude that gross recklessness satisfies 
the scienter requirement of § 523(a)(2)(A). 
 
 First, we look to this Circuit’s precedent. In Cohen III, 
we reviewed a district court conclusion that a defendant’s 
misrepresentations about the legal amount of rent that could 
be charged for an apartment satisfied § 523(a)(2)(A)’s 
scienter requirement. The petitioner, though well aware of 
landlord-tenant laws favorable to him, claimed ignorance of 
rent control provisions in a systematic effort to overcharge 
renters. Cohen III, 106 F.3d at 54. The district court 
interpreted § 523(a)(2)(A) to require that: 
                                                                                                     
Bankruptcy Court or District Court holdings. The Bankruptcy 
Court explicitly stated that Bocchino’s conduct was 
“extremely reckless” and, therefore, “the SEC has met its 
burden of establishing the nondischargeability of sums 
assessed . . . .” In re Bocchino, 504 B.R. at 408. The District 
Court also identified the incoherence of Bocchino’s 
argument. Bocchino, 2014 WL 4796425 at *3 (“Though 
appellant acknowledges at the outset that ‘an intent to deceive 
may be found upon a finding of recklessness,’ he, somewhat 
confusingly, argues that ‘actual wrongful intent to deceive’ is 
also required. Both statements, however, cannot be true . . . 
.”). Therefore, we interpret Bocchino’s argument to be that 
§ 523(a)(2)(A) requires actual intent to defraud.  
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(1) the debtor obtained money, property or 
services through a material 
misrepresentation; (2) the debtor, at the 
time, knew the representation was false or 
made with gross recklessness as to its truth; 
(3) the debtor intended to deceive the 
creditor; (4) the creditor reasonably relied on 
the debtor's false representations; and (5) the 
creditor sustained a loss and damages as a 
proximate result of the debtor's materially 
false representations. 
Cohen II, 191 B.R. at 604 (emphasis added) (quoting In re 
Poskanzer, 143 B.R. 991, 999 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1992) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). On appeal, we approved of this 
formulation:  
 
We have carefully considered both the facts 
and the law and we find no error in the 
district court’s conclusion that Cohen 
committed fraud within the meaning of 11 
U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) . . . . [T]he district 
court applied the correct principles of law . . 
. . [W]e affirm without discussion the 
district court’s order affirming the 
bankruptcy judge’s findings of fraud under 
[] the bankruptcy code. 
Cohen III, 106 F.3d at 55.  
 Section 523(a)(2)(A) does not explicitly state what 
level of reliance, materiality, or intentionality is required. 
Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 68 (1995). The language of the 
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Section, however, has only changed slightly through the 
Bankruptcy Act’s amendments. Id. at 65. The Supreme Court 
has stated that this relatively slow evolution instructs us that 
the terms “are common-law terms, and . . . they imply 
elements that the common law has defined them to include.” 
Id. at 68–70. The fact that Congress did not enumerate 
specific elements does not negate its intent to import their 
common law significance. Id. Therefore, we look to the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts for guidance. Id.; see also, 
e.g., In re Biondo, 180 F.3d 126, 134 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 525). As the Restatement 
describes the scienter requirement: 
 
A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the 
maker (a) knows or believes that the matter 
is not as he represents it to be, (b) does not 
have the confidence in the accuracy of his 
representation that he states or implies, or 
(c) knows that he does not have the basis for 
his representation that he states or implies. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 526. Absent statutory 
restrictions, we have maintained that acting with a reckless 
disregard for the truth establishes scienter for securities fraud. 
McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(superseded by statute); see also Institutional Investors Group 
v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 267 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting 
heightened pleading standard of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act may still be met with sufficient 
circumstantial evidence of reckless behavior). Allowing gross 
recklessness to satisfy the scienter requirement would also 
accord with other circuits who have considered the issue. See 
In re Rembert, 141 F.3d 277, 280 (6th Cir. 1998) (requiring 
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proof that “the debtor obtained money through a material 
misrepresentation that, at the time, the debtor knew was false 
or made with gross recklessness as to its truth”); Mayer v. 
Spanel Int’l, Ltd., 51 F.3d 670, 673–75 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[A] 
creditor must prove that the debtor obtained the money 
through representations which the debtor either knew to be 
false or made with such reckless disregard for the truth as to 
constitute willful misrepresentation.”); In re White, 128 F. 
App’x at 998–99 (4th Cir. 2005) (“A showing of reckless 
indifference to the truth is sufficient to demonstrate the 
requisite intent to deceive.”).6  
 
 We also draw support from the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of a related Bankruptcy Act provision. In Bullock v. 
BankChampaign, N.A., the Court interpreted § 523(a)(4) so as 
to include a prohibition on discharge for defalcation 
committed by gross recklessness. 133 S.Ct. 1754, 1759 
(2013). Section 523(a)(4) prohibits discharge for debts 
obtained through “fraud or defalcation while acting in a 
fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny.” 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(4). On account of the term’s kinship with other 
statutory terms, including fraud, the Court reasoned that the 
culpable state of mind requirement was one “involving 
knowledge of, or gross recklessness in respect to, the 
improper nature of the relevant fiduciary behavior.” Bullock, 
133 S.Ct. at 1757. In so holding, Bullock also found support 
                                              
6 District courts within this Circuit have also adopted 
this position. See In re Purington, No. 12-4135, 2013 WL 
3442893, at *2–3 (D.N.J. July 9, 2013); In re Pandolfelli, 
Nos. 11-5179, 11-5231, 11-7031, 2012 WL 503668, at *7 
(D.N.J. Feb. 15, 2012); In re Reynolds, 193 B.R. 195, 200 
(D.N.J. Feb. 5, 1996).   
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for the scienter requirements from the model penal code that 
imposes liability for willful blindness. Id. at 1759–60. 
Bocchino has not presented a compelling argument why the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning for § 523(a)(4) should not apply 
with similar force to § 523(a)(2)(A).  
 
 We have also applied similar reasoning in other areas 
of the Bankruptcy Code. In In re Cohn, 54 F.3d 1108 (3d Cir. 
1995), we examined a similar question with respect to 
§ 523(a)(2)(B). That Section renders money obtained by 
materially false written statements nondischargeable. 11 
U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B). Though the statute contains an express 
“intent to deceive” requirement unlike § 523(a)(2)(A), we 
allowed a claimant to prove intent to deceive by showing, by 
a totality of the circumstances, reckless indifference or 
reckless disregard of the accuracy of information. In re Cohn, 
54 F.3d at 1119. Similarly, in In re Docteroff, we noted that 
“[b]ankruptcy courts have overwhelmingly held that a 
debtor’s silence regarding material fact can constitute a false 
representation actionable under [S]ection 523(a)(2)(A).” 133 
F.3d 210, 216 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Van Horne, 823 
F.2d 1285, 1288 (8th Cir. 1987) (collecting cases)). We echo 
Bullock by noting that uniformity in the federal law is 
important, and we have not been presented with a strong 
argument why the statute should be read differently than the 
related provisions of the Act. To read § 523(a)(2)(A) so 
restrictively as to sanction Bocchino’s gross recklessness 
would be at odds with the general principles of the Act. 
Bullock, 133 S.Ct. at 1761. A debtor will rarely admit to 
intentional deception, thus intent is most often inferred from 
the totality of the circumstances. Palmacci v. Umpierrez, 121 
F.3d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1997). 
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 Therefore, we affirm the District Court’s holding that 
§ 523(a)(2)(A)’s scienter requirement was satisfied by 
Bocchino’s gross recklessness. 
 
 3. Proximate Cause 
 We have little trouble finding that Bocchino’s gross 
negligence was also the proximate cause of his clients’ losses. 
Proximate cause is a term of art, demanding sufficient 
connection between the injury and the conduct alleged. 
Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 
268 (1992). “At bottom, the notion of proximate cause 
reflects ‘ideas of what justice demands, or of what is 
administratively possible and convenient.’” Id. (quoting W. 
Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and 
Keeton on Law of Torts § 41, p. 264 (5th ed. 1984)). 
Proximate cause includes both cause-in-fact and legal 
causation. Fedorczyk v. Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd., 82 F.3d 
69, 73 (3d Cir. 1996). Bocchino does not challenge that his 
actions were the cause-in-fact of his clients’ injuries. Legal 
cause is established where the loss was reasonably expected 
to result from reliance upon the misrepresentation. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 548A. There is no serious 
question on the facts that Bocchino failed to investigate the 
private placements before soliciting sales or that Bocchino’s 
clients would not have purchased the fraudulent stock absent 
Bocchino’s grossly reckless misrepresentations. A reasonable 
review of the fundamentals of the ventures would have 
revealed that the placements were worthless. Therefore, 
proximate cause has been established. 
 
 Furthermore, we agree with the District Court that the 
actions of the principals of Traderz and Fargo were not a 
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superseding cause. Bocchino, 2014 WL 4796425, at *8 (citing 
Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S.Ct. 1186, 1192 (2011)). A 
superseding cause is “a later cause of independent origin that 
was not foreseeable.” Exxon Co., U.S.A., v. Sofec, Inc., 517 
U.S. 830, 837 (1996); Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 585 
F.3d 765, 771–72 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 443). Where an actor’s conduct is a 
substantial factor in bringing about harm, an intervening force 
created by the actor’s negligent conduct will not suffice to 
break legal cause. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 443. We 
find that the collapse of the private placements was neither 
abnormal nor extraordinary given Bocchino’s lack of due 
diligence. Given the woeful state of the entities when 
Bocchino solicited the investments, we find that the losses 
were manifestly foreseeable. Moreover, not only has 
Bocchino failed to challenge any of the factfinding below, we 
note that nothing in the record indicates that the District Court 
committed clear error in concluding that the investments were 
destined for failure.   
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District 
Court’s order affirming the Bankruptcy Court’s order of 
nondischargeability. 
